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ASSETS HELD HOSTAGE: PRETRIAL RESTRAINT OF THIRD-
PARTY PROPERTY UNDER CRIMINAL RICO
Federal prosecutors who pursue convictions under the Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations statute' (RICO) may deserve hefty
raises. Not only have they discovered an effective law enforcement tool
in criminal forfeiture,2 but they also have found a means to reduce the
federal deficit.3 In addition to possible forfeiture, a racketeering4 indict-
ment carries with it the threat of a pretrial restraint of a wide range of
assets. Armed with such a weapon against Wall Street investors, federal
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, tit. IX, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, amended
by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 302, 98 Stat. 2040
(1970), (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1961-1968 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989)).
2. Section 1963 of the RICO statute authorizes a fine of up to $25,000 and imprisonment of up
to 20 years, as well as the forfeiture of specific interests for a criminal RICO offense. See infra notes
9-11 and accompanying text.
3. Under § 1963(f), the Attorney General must deposit in the Treasury any proceeds from the
sale of forfeited assets in excess of the U.S. government's expenses of carrying out the forfeiture and
sale and any legitimate third-party claims. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(f) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
4. Any person who acquires an interest in or conducts the affairs of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity commits an offense under the RICO statute. See 18 U.S.C.S.
§§ 1961-1963 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989); Reed & Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable "Inter-
eift,. - and Procedural Due Process, 62 N.C.L. REV. 57, 59 (1983).
-Racketeering activity" means any of a number of acts (or threats) under federal (and state) law,
including securities fraud, mail and wire fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and embezzlement from pension,
welfare and union funds. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1961(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). A "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). See also H.J. Inc.
v Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989) (construing § 1961(5)).
An -'enterprise" includes "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18
U S.C. § 1961(4) (1982). -Enterprise" encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises.
United State, sv. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
S., generally I K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY §§ 7:01-:30 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
5. Section 1963(d) authorizes the restraint of any forfeitable property, which § 1963(a)(2) de-
fines a the defendant's -'(A) interest in, (B) security of, (C) claim against; or (D) property or con-
tractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over; any enterprise which the person has
establihed, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of [in violation of
RICO's substantive provisions]." 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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prosecutors have begun "milken ' ' 6 capital-rich securities firms, 7 which
hope to avoid the restraint or ultimate forfeiture of their assets under
RICO.
RICO's criminal forfeiture provision, section 1963, empowers a dis-
trict court to enter a pretrial restraining order or injunction, to require
the posting of a bond, or to "take any other action" to prevent a defend-
ant from dissipating potentially forfeitable property prior to conviction.8
Among the types of property subject to forfeiture9 is a defendant's pro-
prietary interest' ° in a legitimate business such as a corporation or part-
nership." To the extent that unindicted third parties hold similar
property interests in the defendant's business,1 2 a restraint on the busi-
ness' underlying assets can deprive these third parties of their property
interests, 1 3 effectively allowing the government to hold the assets hostage
6. This reference is to Michael Milken, the former head of the high-yield "junk bond" depart-
ment of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. The federal government has indicted Mr. Milken and two
associates on 98 counts, including racketeering and securities and tax fraud, and is seeking forfeiture
of $1.8 billion, most of which consists of salaries and bonuses paid to Milken. 21 SEc. REG. & L.
REP. 483 (1989). Drexel itself is a Wall Street investment firm that avoided criminal RICO charges
when it agreed to plead guilty to lesser federal offenses and pay $650 million to the government. See
Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1989, at Al, col. 6; Wall St. J., Dec. 23, 1988, at A6, col. 2. Drexel also agreed
to a settlement of SEC civil charges, under which it will pay additional penalties and undergo per-
sonnel and structural changes. See Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1989, at A3, col. 1.
7. On August 5, 1988, federal prosecutors indicted several officials of Princeton/Newport
Partners, L.P., an investment partnership, marking the first time the U.S. government has charged
officials of a securities firm under criminal RICO. See infra notes 146-83 and accompanying text.
Federal prosecutors have indicated that they will continue to use RICO to fight securities crime,
much to the dismay of investment bankers and broker-dealers. New RICO Use: A Step Too Far?,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 28, 1988, at 27. Federal prosecutors also have recently extended RICO to Chi-
cago's futures markets, where the government has charged a number of traders with criminal RICO
violations following an FBI undercover operation lasting over two years. See Chi. Tribune, Aug. 3,
1989, at 1, col. 6; Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1989, at Al, col 6.
8. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(d)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
9. Property subject to criminal forfeiture under RICO includes "(1) real property... ; and (2)
tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securi-
ties." Id. § 1963(b).
10. See supra note 5.
11. See United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 714 F.2d 137, cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984) (defendant's one-third interest in partnership subject to forfeiture);
United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant sole shareholder of corporation);
Comment, RICO Forfeitures and the Rights of Innocent Third Parties, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 345, 353
(1982). See also Reed & Gill, supra note 4, at 71.
12. The scope of this Note encompasses third parties in general and does not deal specifically
with legal distinctions among shareholders, limited and general partners, secured and unsecured
creditors, spouses, or other third parties who may dispute a RICO defendant's legal ownership of
potentially forfeitable property.
13. Two commentators note that the attempt to forfeit assets of a legitimate enterprise impli-
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to its prosecutorial demands.' 4
In United States v. Regan, 5 the Second Circuit interpreted section
1963 as authorizing restraining orders against unindicted third parties.
The court rejected the third parties' argument that common-law princi-
ples preclude the court from imposing a restraining order on parties who
are not before the court.' 6 The Second Circuit's decision may extend the
scope of pretrial restraints to encompass ultimately nonforfeitable
property. t
This Note examines the extent to which Congress intended to author-
ize district courts to bind unindicted third parties with pretrial re-
straining orders under criminal RICO. Part I discusses the distinction
between criminal and civil forfeiture and the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of the due process implications of forfeiture with respect to innocent
cates the valid proprietary rights of third parties more significantly than an attempt to forfeit the
assets of an illegitimate enterprise. See Reed & Gill, supra note 4, at 58 n.6.
This Note focuses on third-party property interests in legitimate enterprises in which a RICO
defendant also has an interest. While it does address procedural due process concerns with respect
to third parties, see infra notes 42-57, this Note more narrowly focuses on the extent to which a
district court has the statutory authority to restrain unindicted third-party property.
14 Some commentators believe that federal prosecutors utilized the threat of asset restraints to
coerce Drexel, Burnham, Lambert to avoid racketeering charges and agree to a plea bargain. See
Appleson. Racketeering Controversy Rages as Drexel Awaits Charges, The Reuter Bus. Rep., Dec. 1,
1'88 ('" 'RICO is like the birth control pill was to the sexual revolution in the 1960s. It could result
in prosecutorial promiscuity,'" quoting Stanley Arkin, a prominent white-collar criminal defense
lawyer and lecturer on RICO); Orland, Business Forum: The Drexel Case; When Pressure Forces
Guilt' Pkas, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1989, at C3, col. I (Drexel case gives pause to reexamine "the
fundamental fairness of this staggering imbalance of power"); supra note 6. But cf. Grady, Some
Would Indict RICO, Chi. Trubune, Aug. 3, 1989, at 22, col. I ("[RICO] should apply if your collar
is blue or if your collar is white or if you don't wear a collar at all. A person's name doesn't have to
end in a vowel to be prosecuted under this statute.") (quoting Professor G. Robert Blakey, one of the
original drafters of RICO). For the Supreme Court's most recent view regarding the scope of RICO,
see imira note 69.
While this Note was in the publication process, the United States Justice Department publicly
announced new guidelines for criminal RICO prosecutions. See Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1989, at B5, col.
4. The new guidelines provide that "the government will not seek to disrupt the normal, legitimate
business activities of the defendant" when attempting to freeze assets before trial, and that the gov-
ernment "will not seek .. to take from third parties assets legitmately transferred to them." Id.
The impact of these guidelines, however, is unclear. David Runkel, the Justice Department's chief
spokesman, described the new guidelines as "a codification and a clarification far more than a new
dircctton." Id. The guidelines themselves were not publicly available before publication of this
Note Telephone interview with Kathy Schroeder, U.S. Attorney's Office, St. Louis, Missouri (Octo-
her 31, 1989).
15 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988)
lo Id. at 120.
17 Id at 120-22. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
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third parties. Part II provides a perspective on the use of RICO's crimi-
nal forfeiture sanction as it affects third-party interests. Part III analyzes
the Second Circuit's decision in Regan and the potential ramifications for
third-party property owners. Finally, Part IV proposes legislation to de-
limit clearly a district court's power to preserve potentially forfeitable
property prior to a RICO defendant's conviction.
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL FORFEITURE
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
THIRD-PARTY RIGHTS
A. Origins and Development of Forfeiture
The basic distinction between criminal forfeiture and civil forfeiture is
that the former proceeds in personam,18 while the latter typically pro-
ceeds in rem." Until Congress passed RICO in 1970,' 0 criminal forfei-
ture was a rarity in American jurisprudence.2" On the other hand, courts
have widely applied civil forfeiture to further punitive, deterrent and re-
medial purposes22 and to remove prohibited property that Congress spe-
cifically identified as injurious to the public.23 While the liberal
application of civil forfeiture arguably could translate to the criminal
context, 24 the history of the two proceedings belies this easy comparison.
18. An "in personam" action seeks judgment "against the person," involving personal rights
and requiring jurisdiction over the person. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979).
19. An "in rem" action is a proceeding "against the thing" or directly against property and
requires jurisdiction over the property. Id. at 713.
20. See United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1412 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987) (RICO is the first
modem statute "to impose forfeiture as a criminal sanction directly upon an individual defendant
rather than through a separate in rem proceeding against property involved in a criminal context,"
(citing United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979)); S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
193, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3,182, 3376 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225].
See also Reed & Gill, supra note 4, at 69 n.29.
In 1970 Congress also provided for criminal forfeiture in § 408 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 848, 853 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989)) (also known as the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise Act (CCE)). See generally Markus, Procedural Implications of Forfeiture Under RICO,
the CCE, and the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Reformning the Trial Structure, 59 TEMP.
L.Q. 1097 (1986).
21. See Reed & Gill, supra note 4, at 60-61.
22. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
23. See Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties amid Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional
Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379 (1976) (Supreme Court looks at whether or not legislature labels
forfeiture "criminal" when determining extent of constitutional protections available to property
owners).
24. In specific instances, the Supreme Court effectively has disregarded or blurred the distine-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/5
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1. Criminal Forfeiture
Criminal forfeiture arose under English common law as a punishment
for the commission of specific crimes, but it fell into disfavor in this
country.25 In 1790, Congress proscribed criminal forfeiture for any con-
viction.26  With one exception, 27 Congress abstained from such in per-
sonam forfeiture until 1970 when it enacted RICO's criminal forfeiture
provision.28
The critical characteristic of criminal forfeiture is that it follows and
depends upon the property owner's conviction. 29  A court, therefore,
must establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant to render the de-
fendant's property forfeitable upon conviction.3" By definition, an in per-
sonam forfeiture is a form of punishment, the scope of which the
legislature determines when it defines the associated criminal conduct.3"
The disassociation of the defendant from her property, therefore, supple-
tion between civil and criminal forfeiture. Dictum in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663 (1974) suggests forfeiture could be used to punish the defendant himself. See infra
notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
25 See Taylor, Forfeiture Under 18 U.S. § 1963-RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17 AM.
CRIM. L REV. 379, 380-82 (1979). At common law, a convicted criminal forfeited all of her estate.
The framers of the Constitution, however, specifically mentioned forfeiture only as punishment for
treason and restricted its scope to the forfeiture of a traitor's life estate: "The Congress shall have
Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, col.
2
26. See Markus, supra note 20, at 1103 & n.34; Taylor, supra note 25, at 382 & n.26.
27. See Markus, supra note 20, at 1103 & n.35 (seizure of life estate of rebels and their
sympathizers).
28. See supra note 20. Unlike common-law criminal forfeiture, RICO does not require the
forfeiture of the defendant's entire estate, but instead requires the forfeiture of specifically enumer-
ated property interests. See Reed & Gill, supra note 4, at 60; supra note 2.
29. See Reed & Gill, supra note 4, at 60. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(e) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1989) ("Upon conviction .. .the court shall enter a judgment of forfeiture .. ") (emphasis added);
Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts -
Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1036 (1980) ("Criminal forfeiture is based on
personal guilt; the rights of the government in the property derive from an in personam judgment
against the offender.").
30. "It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam resulting from litigation
in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process " Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969) (citing Han-
sberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940)).
31. At common law, there was no question as to the scope of a criminal forfeiture because the
defendant forfeited her entire estate. See supra note 25. Under RICO, however, the scope of a
defendant's criminal conduct determines the scope of the in personam forfeiture. See Reed, Crimi-
nal Forleiture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Raising the Stakes, 22 Am. CRIM. L.
RE%'. 747 (1985). The problem of defining the scope of a statutory in personam forfeiture, therefore,
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ments the traditional criminal sanctions of fines and imprisonment.32
2. Civil Forfeiture
As compared to criminal forfeiture, civil forfeiture has a relatively
lengthy history33 and has been much more widely accepted in this coun-
try.34 A civil, or in rem, forfeiture is based on the legal fiction that the
property itself is the offender.35 The court thus exercises its jurisdiction
solely over the potentially forfeitable property irrespective of any per-
sonal jurisdiction over the property owner.36 In addition, title to prop-
erty subject to civil forfeiture vests in the government at the time the
property is in violation of the law.37 Under this "relation back" doctrine,
the government may void all transactions involving the forfeitable prop-
erty that occur subsequent to the violation.38
An in rem forfeiture proceeds independently of any criminal proceed-
is particulary complex when forfeitable property includes proprietary interests, and not just tangible
real or personal property that the legislature defines as the instrument or reward of the crime.
32. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 191.
33. Civil forfeiture dates back to Biblical times and developed through medieval and modern
England. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680 (1974); Markus, supra
note 20, at 1105; Reed & Gill, supra note 4, at 63-65.
34. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-88.
35. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971). See Reed & Gill,
supra note 4, at 62.
36. Unlike an in personam forfeiture, the scope of an in rem forfeiture is clear and narrowly
defined because the court's jurisdiction extends to the forfeitable property itself. See Reed, slipra
note 31, at 748, 758.
37. See Reed, supra note 31, at 756.
38. The relation back doctrine also allows the government to seize the property under civil
forfeiture immediately and, under some circumstances, without prior notice or hearing. See Calero.
Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678-79, 680 (1974) (no prior notice or hearing necessary under "limited circum-
stances" or in an "extraordinary situation"); cf North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419
U.S. 601 (1975) (state statute permitting garnishment without early hearing violated due process
clause of fourteenth amendment); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (state replevin provisions
invalid under fourteenth amendment because result is deprivation of property without prior hear-
ing). See also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 193 ("A civil forfeiture is commenced by the
government's seizure of the asset"). The Supreme Court has recently recognized the legitimate use
of the relation back doctrine in the criminal forfeiture context. See Caplin & Drysdale v. United
States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2653 (1989) (§ 853(c), relation back provision of Continuing Criminal Enter-
prise statute, "reflects the application of the long-recognized and lawful practice of vesting title to
any forfeitable assets, in the United States, at the time of the criminal act giving rise to forfeiture"),
United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2665 (1989) (Congress did not "intendo] to permit the
effectiveness of the powerful 'relation back' provision of § 853(c) ... to be nullified by" district
court's discretion to exempt from forfeiture or pretrial restraint aisets that defendant intends to use
to retain attorney). See also infra note 43; notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
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ing against a defendant;3" the owner's guilt or innocence of any related
crime does not affect the outcome of an in rem proceeding. 40  In rem
forfeiture, therefore, legitimately can impinge upon property rights of in-
nocent third parties.41
B. Due Process Analysis
The Supreme Court has not determined whether due process protec-
tions42 apply to innocent third parties in criminal forfeiture cases.
43
There is a long line of precedent, however, that supports broad govern-
mental power in civil forfeiture proceedings. 44
39. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684 ("proceeding in rem stands independent of and wholly
unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam") (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) I
(1827)) One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (holding
that fifth amendment double jeopardy clause does not bar forfeiture action subsequent to acquittal of
smuggling charges because forfeiture did not involve two criminal trials or punishments). Convic-
tion of an underlying offense is not a condition precedent to forfeiture of the property in an in rem
proceeding. See I K. BRICKEY, supra note 4, at 322-23 n.434.
40, See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
41. See Reed, supra note 31, at 756 & n.51.
42 The fifth amendment provides: "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment similarly
reads: - . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
43. The Supreme Court recently has rejected several due process challenges to the forfeiture
and pretrial restraint provisions of the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (CCE), 21 U.S.C.
§§ 848, 853, as they apply to criminal defendants. In Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
2646 (1989), the Court held that § 853 of the CCE, which requires the forfeiture of a criminal
defendant's illegally acquired property and provides no exception for property used to pay attorney's
fees, did not impermissibly burden defendant's sixth amendment right to retain counsel of his choice.
Writing for the five-member majority, Justice White refused to invalidate the forfeiture provision
despite the argument that it "'upset the 'balance of forces between the accuser and the accused' "
contrary to the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 2656. The Court stated that "due
process claims alleging [abuses of forfeiture provisions] are cognizable only in specific cases of
prosecutorial misconduct ... or when directed to a rule that is inherently unconstitutional." Id. at
2657.
In a companion case, United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989), the Court held that the
CCE authorizes a district court to freeze assets in a defendant's possession, even when the defendant
seeks to use such assets to pay his attorney. Justice White, writing for the same five-member major-
ity, noted that the Court's holding in Caplin & Drysdale supported a finding that "a pretrial re-
straining order does not 'arbitrarily' interfere with a defendant's 'fair opportunity' to retain counsel,"
and that the criminal forfeiture statute, therefore, did not offend the fifth or sixth amendments. Id.
at 2666-67 (citation omitted). The Court, however, expressly refrained from deciding whether the
due process clause requires a hearing before a court may impose a pretrial restraining order. Id. at
2666 n 10.
44 See United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242 (1986) (property owner had no due pro-
cess right to speedy disposition of petition for remission or mitigation of forfeiture where postseizure
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1194 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 67:1187
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,4  the Supreme Court
held that a civil forfeiture scheme is not unconstitutional merely because
it interferes with the property interests of innocent property owners. The
Court reaffirmed its prior decisions46 that rejected the innocence of the
property owner as a defense to forfeiture.4 7 The Court, however, placed
some emphasis on its finding that the particular forfeiture statutes at is-
sue48 furthered the "punitive and deterrent" purposes of similar forfei-
ture statutes.49 The Court's reasoning suggests that legislative use of civil
forfeiture does not necessarily conflict with punishing an individual for
hearing was provided); United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S.
555 (1983) (due process does not require federal customs officials to conduct hearing before seizing
forfeitable items); Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663. But cf United States v. United States Coin & Cur-
rency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1971) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination available in
forfeiture proceeding); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (privilege against self-
incrimination).
45. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). In Calero-Toledo, the police seized a yacht, on which they discovered
marijuana, pursuant to a Puerto Rican statute that made vessels used to transport controlled sub-
stances subject to seizure and forfeiture to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, The police seized the
yacht without providing notice or a hearing to the owner, who was neither involved in, nor aware of,
the violation. .d. at 665-69.
The district court, relying on Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), held that the failure to pro-
vide preseizure notice and hearing rendered the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure did not violate due
process because this case was an "extraordinary situation" justifying immediate seizure under Fuen-
tes. 416 U.S. at 677. The Court found this case extraordinary because (1) the statutes served "a
significant governmental purpose" by creating an in rem forfeiture proceeding; (2) preseizure notice
and hearing might allow the owner to remove the property to another jurisdiction and thereby frus-
trate the purpose of the statutes; and (3) government officials, and not self-interested private parties,
initiated the seizure. Id. at 676-80.
46. See id. at 683-86. See, e.g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926) (forfeiture of innocent
owner's automobile under state law did not violate fourteenth amendment); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v.
United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921) (federal tax fraud forfeiture statute did not deprive innocent
owner of property in violation of fifth amendment); Dobbins Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395
(1878) (owner's innocence no defense to seizure of property used in connection with distillery); The
Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827) (piracy conviction not a prerequisite to forfeiture of ship used
in violation of federal admiralty statute).
47. 416 U.S. at 680, 683-86. The Court also reviewed the development of, in rem forfeiture at
common law and under federal customs and revenue laws, noting the proliferation of federal and
state forfeiture statutes. Id. at 680-83.
48. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 2512 (a)(4), (b) (Supp. 1973) provided for the government
seizure of "[a]ll conveyances ... which are used, or intended for use, to transport [controlled sub-
stances]." P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 34, § 1722 (1971) described the procedure for implementing the
forfeiture of illegal conveyances, a procedure that included immediate seizure, subsequent notice and
hearing, right to post bond, and ultimate sale at auction. See 416 U.S. at 665-67 nn.l-2.
49. Id. at 686. The Court suggested that forfeiture statutes, in addition, might induce innocent
third parties, such as lessors, bailors, or secured creditors, "to exercise greater care in transferring
possession of their property." Id. at 687-88.
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the underlying criminal activity.5" In this respect, the decision somewhat
blurs the distinction between civil and criminal forfeiture.51
In Calero-Toledo, the Supreme Court did not rule out the possibility
that forfeiture statutes can have constitutional implications in other cir-
cumstances. 52 The Court recognized that when a third-party owner is
not involved in, and lacks awareness of, the wrongful activity and does
all he reasonably can do to prevent the wrongful use of his property,
forfeiture may not serve a legitimate purpose and may be unduly oppres-
sive.5 3 The Court thus did not foreclose the innocence of third-party
property owners as a defense in civil forfeiture proceedings.
Despite the Supreme Court's almost uniform approval of civil forfei-
ture statutes regarding their effect on third-party property interests, 54 it
is unclear whether the Court would apply the same standard of due pro-
cess review to criminal forfeiture statutes such as RICO. The Court at
least partially has justified its approval of civil forfeiture on the in rem
nature of the contested forfeiture statutes. On the other hand, the
Court has recognized the "quasi-criminal" nature of forfeiture statutes
that relate to the property owner's wrongdoing. 56 The Supreme Court
has not addressed directly the hazy distinction between criminal and civil
forfeiture. Until it does, lower courts should consider the historical and
legal differences between in personam and in rem forfeitures before con-
50 See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971) (forfeiture
proceedings, though civil in form, are criminal in nature when instituted because of owner's illegal
use of property); One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965) (forfeiture proceed-
ing is "quasi-criminal" in character).
One commentator suggests that the Supreme Court applies greater constitutional protection to
punishments that the legislature labels as "criminal" even in the context of forfeiture statutes. He
concludes that the Court will consider property forfeitures as criminal only if they carry that legisla-
tive label. Clark, supra note 23, at 382-83, 397. See also 1 K. BRICKEY, supra note 4, at 322 (forfei-
ture proceedings are typically "in rem civil actions with quasi-criminal characteristics").
Other forms of civil forfeiture. garnishment and attachment, are generally governed by state law.
Both are provisional remedies, typically for actions by individuals or entities seeking money judg-
ments and are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
Fi IDER, PRACTICi AND PROCLDURI: Civii §§ 2931-36 (1973).
51 See 5upra notes 25-41 and accompanying text.
52 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688-90. The Court clarified that Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715,
did not overrule its prior decisions upholding the forfeiture of innocent parties' property. The Court
distinguished Coin & Currency as applicable to statutes that apply only to persons "'significantly
involved in a criminal enterprise.*" 416 U.S. at 688 (quoting Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. at 721).
53 Calro-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90.
54 Sec upra note 46 and accompanying text.
55 See" vupra note 47.
51 Sce wupra note 50 and accompanying text.
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eluding that the relatively large body of in rem forfeiture case law applies
with equal force to an in personam setting such as RICO.5 7
II. RICO-THE RESURRECTION OF CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
RICO represents the first modern statute"8 to impose forfeiture as a
punishment directly upon an individual, rather than as a separate pro-
ceeding against property involved in criminal conduct.5 9 However, vari-
ous components of RICO's criminal forfeiture provision, section 1963,60
indicate that Congress incorporated some of the concepts of an in rem
forfeiture to facilitate punishment of the wrongdoer. 6' Because RICO
also contemplates the forfeiture of third-party property, this apparent
conceptual conflict permits the inadvertent punishment of innocent third
parties under the guise of an in personam forfeiture statute. An analysis
of RICO's purpose, broad judicial construction, and procedurally com-
plex forfeiture provision suggests that Congress correctly labeled RICO's
criminal forfeiture sanction as an in personam punishment.
A. Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970
L Statutory Framework and Judicial Construction
Congress enacted RICO to eliminate organized crime's infiltration of
legitimate businesses.62 Section 1963 of the statute requires that the con-
victed defendant forfeit "any interest in ... or property or contractual
57. For decisions that recognize this distinction, see United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S.
715 (1974); United States v. Reckmeyer, 628 F. Supp. 616, 619 (E.D. Va.) (in rem is legal fiction
"constitutionally infirm in the punitive context of an in personam forfeiture"), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
850 (1986); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 242 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (distinctions between
proceedings in rem and in personam "make resort to civil forfeiture cases as guidance in criminal
forfeiture cases" questionable); Reed & Gill, supra note 4, at 68 (concluding that United States Coin
& Currency held "in personam procedures provide greater due process protections than in rem pro-
cedures"). But cf United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
927 (1980) ("no substantial difference between an in rem forfeiture proceeding and a forfeiture pro-
ceeding brought directly against the owner" with respect to severity of punishment under eighth
amendment).
58. The Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982), which also provided
for criminal forfeiture of a defendant's illicit profits and interest in an enterprise, was enacted in
1970. See Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970).
59. Congress specifically labeled RICO criminal forfeiture an "in personam" punishment. See
S. RiP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 193.
60. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(a)-(m) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
61. See hifra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
62. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983); United States v. Turkette. 452 U.S. 576.
591-93 (1981) (citing House and Senate hearings).
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right affording a source of influence over" any enterprise "which the per-
son has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in
the conduct of, in violation of [s]ection 1962.2" Congress reinstituted in
personam forfeiture under section 1963 to separate the racketeer from
the corrupted organization and to prevent his continued control of the
enterprise from prison.'
Although Congress enacted RICO to fight organized crime, it has not
precluded RICO from reaching white collar crime in general.65 Congress
broadly defined the term "racketeering activity" to include a wide range
of predicate offenses that are not unique to organized crime.6 6 By giving
RICO such a broad scope, Congress gave prosecutors a potent law en-
forcement tool, leaving courts the difficult task of applying a substan-
tively and procedurally complicated statute.
Recognizing Congress' purpose behind RICO's criminal forfeiture
provision, the Supreme Court has favored a broad reading of the criminal
RICO statute.67 In Russello v. United States,68 the Supreme Court stated
b3 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(a). See supra note 4.
Section 1962 makes it unlawful for any person
(a) . . who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
racketeering activity ... , to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income,
or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise. . .
(b) .. through a pattern of racketeering activity.., to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise ....
(c) . .. employed by or associated with any enterprise . . . to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racke-
teering activity ....
(d) ... to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this
section.
18 US CS. § 1962 (Law. Co-op 1979 & Supp. 1989).
64 S c Russello, 464 U.S. at 27-28 (forfeiture represents "attack on ... [racketeer's] source of
economic power itself") (quoting S. REP. No 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 79 (1969)); Huber, 603
F.2d at 392 (forfeiture designed not onl to punish, but also to separate racketeer from enterprise); I
K. BRicKEtN, wupra note 4, at 319
65 1 K. BRICKEV, supra note 4, at 233 See also Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Crini-
nal Part I & II, 87 CoiUss. L. Ri-v. 661 (1987). See supra notes 6-7.
66 18 U.S.C.S. § 1961(1) (Law Co-op Supp. 1989). See supra note 4.
67 See generally H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989) (refusing to
read narrowly RICO's "pattern of racketeering" element as requiring allegation and proof of "or-
ganized crime" nexus); United States, v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (holding in favor of broad
definition of "enterprise"); swupra note 4. See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479
(1085) ("RICO is to be read broadly" not only because of its "expansive language and overall ap-
proach" but also because of express admonition that RICO must "be liberally construed to effectuate
its remedial purposes") (citations omitted).
6S 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
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that RICO's legislative history demonstrates Congress' intent "to pro-
vide new weapons of unprecedented scope" for its fight against organized
crime.69 The Court held that interests subject to forfeiture under section
1963 include profits and proceeds that the defendant derived from racke-
teering and not merely his interest in the enterprise.
In Russello, the Supreme Court refused to uphold a narrow reading of
the term "interest" in section 1963, partially because such a reading
would contradict legislative intent.7t The Court suggested that Congress
did not intend to limit section 1963 forfeiture with "rigid and technical
definitions," but selected a more general term in keeping with the stat-
ute's policy of broad coverage.72 The Court reasoned that restricting sec-
tion 1963 to forfeiture of interest in the enterprise would provide the
racketeer an incentive to loot the infiltrated enterprise and thereby defeat
Congress' goal of separating the racketeer from his illegal profit."
Lower federal courts have implemented Congress' desire to remove the
criminal RICO defendant from the corrupted enterprise by identifying a
wide array of forfeitable interests.74 Courts have found that a defend-
ant's entire proprietary interest in the enterprise is subject to forfeiture,
whether or not the defendant has used underlying assets in connection
69. Id. at 26-27. The Court recognized the uniqueness of Congress' purpose to preate new
remedies to "deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those
individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation." Id. at 27
(emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 79 (1969)).
The Court recently has also rejected the argument that RICO's scope extends only to organized
crime in the traditional or functional sense. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2894,
2903 (1989). The Court stated, "[t]he occasion for Congress' action was the perceived need to com-
bat organized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more general statute, one
which, although it had organized crime as its focus, was not limited in application to organized
crime." Id. at 2905.
70. 464 U.S. at 29 n.3. The district court convicted the defendant under criminal RICO for his
involvement in an arson ring and ordered the forfeiture of his fraudulent insurance proceeds. Id. at
17-18. The Supreme Court affirmed, resolving a split among the circuits as to the forfeitability of
profits or proceeds from the racketeering activity. Id. at 18, 29. Congress incorporated the Russello
decision in its 1984 amendments to § 1963. See B. GEORGE, THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CON-
TROi. ACT or- 1984, 585, 593-95 (1986).
71. 464 U.S. at 26-29.
72. Id. at 21.
73. Id. at 28.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1410, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987) (92% interest
in corporation and real estate); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983) (one-third
interest in partnership); United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1982) (100% ofcorpo-
rate stock); United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1982) (motel): United States v. Horak.
633 F. Supp. 190 (N.D. 11. 1986) (job, salary, bonus, pension and profit share).
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with the racketeering activity.75 Because forfeiture completely removes a
defendant from the enterprise, the defendant may be forced to forfeit
more than illicit gains and tainted assets upon conviction.76 With the
financial stakes so high, the RICO defendant has a great incentive to
dissipate her assets prior to conviction.77
2. Pretrial Restraint of Assets
a. The Development of Procedures
Under RICO, Congress authorized district courts to enter pretrial re-
straining orders or to take other actions "in connection with any prop-
erty or other interest subject to forfeiture. '7'  Although the legislative
history of the 1970 Act is silent on this point, Congress presumably in-
tended the pretrial restraining order to prevent a defendant's transfer of
potentially forfeitable property after the indictment but before convic-
tion.7' RICO's original restraining order provision, however, did not dis-
tinguish between defendant and third-party property interests.80
75. See, e:g., United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908 (Ilth Cir. 1986); Cauble, 706 F.2d at
1349-50 (RICO criminal forfeiture does not require identification of specific assets of an enterprise
but only requires forfeiture of a defendant's proprietary interest in enterprise).
76. The following hypothetical illustrates this point. Assume a RICO defendant owns 100% of
a small hotel and restaurant that have a total net worth of $1 million and that she made a profit of
$500,000 through her racketeering activity. Assume also that her racketeering activity required
solely the use of one of the hotel's suites and none of the hotel's or restaurant's other services or
facilities Upon conviction of racketeering charges, the defendant would forfeit her entire business
and proceeds. This is true even though she used only a small portion of the business to facilitate her
racketeering activity (for a total forfeiture of $1.5 million).
77. In the legislative history of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, see infra notes 96-
145 and accompanying text, Congress recognized that "a person who anticipates that some of his
property may be subject to criminal forfeiture has not only an obvious incentive, but also ample
opportunity" to transfer his assets or otherwise escape forfeiture. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at
195.
78 18 U S.C. § 1963(b) (1982). amended by 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
79 Commentators note that the legislative history of the 1970 Act provides no guidance as to
the procedures that apply to RICO's pretrial restraining order provision and indicates no concern on
behalf of Congres.s as to the potential restraint of third-party interests. See Reed & Gill, supra note
4. at 73-74 & n.139. See also Reed, supra note 31, at 761 & n.84 (postindictment, pretrial restraining
order to prevent defendant from dissipating assets prior to verdict) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess,. 57 (1970) and S. REP. No. 617. 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1969)).
80 RICO's original restraining order provision simply read:
In any action brought by the United States under this section, the district courts of the
United States shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or to
take such other actions, including, but not limited to, the acceptance of satisfactory per-
foirniance bonds, in connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture
under this section, a, it shall deem proper.
IS USC § 1963(b) (1982).
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Before 1984, no legislatively mandated procedures existed to protect
property interests of the defendant or third parties prior to trial.8 The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provided the only pretrial proce-
dural guidelines for criminal forfeiture under RICO.82 Rule 7(c)(2), ad-
ded in 1972 to implement criminal forfeiture, provides that "[w]hen an
offense charged may result in a criminal forfeiture, the indictment or in-
formation shall allege the extent of the interest or property subject to for-
feiture."83 On its face, Rule 7(c)(2) pertains only to the content of the
indictment or information and, therefore, provides no specific guidance
concerning the appropriate pretrial restraints a district court may
impose.
In the absence of more specific procedures in section 1963, or any ex-
plicit reference to the use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,84 fed-
eral courts employed restraining orders and injunctions,85 typically civil
remedies, in a criminal context.8 6 District courts thus had to rely solely
on their discretion to formulate pretrial orders to prevent defendants and
third parties from dissipating forfeitable assets. 87 The absence of proce-
81. The only reference to third-party interests appeared in § 1963(c), which provided that the
government would make "due provision for the rights of innocent persons" upon disposition of the
forfeited property after conviction. The remainder of § 1963(c) dealt with the Attorney General's
administrative procedures for seizure and the remission or mitigation of forfeiture. Section 1963(c)
explicitly required reference to customs laws for postconviction procedural guidance. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(c) (1982).
Some commentators regarded former § 1963's reliance on customs laws, which proceeded in rem,
as misplaced. See Reed & Gill, supra note 4, at 73 ("In rem procedures cannot be applied to effectu-
ate an in personam forfeiture.")
82. See generally I K. BRICKEY, supra note 4, at 335.
83. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2) (emphasis added).
Rule 7(c)(2) was "intended to provide procedural implementation" of the 1970 Act. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 7(c)(2) advisory committee's note. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e) (special verdict of
criminal forfeiture where indictment alleges extent of interest); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(2) (judgment
of criminal forfeiture authorizes Attorney General to seize interest or property).
The indictment or information thus provides the defendant notice of what property is potentially
forfeitable. See Markus, supra note 20, at 1098.
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) might provide a source of further procedures courts must follow in
fashioning pretrial restraints. See infra note 87.
85. See generally I 1 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§§ 2941-62 (1973).
86. FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(5) provides that the criminal rules do not apply to federal civil
forfeitures. The 1972 advisory committee's note indicates that the word "civil" was added to clarify
that the criminal rules apply only to criminal forfeitures, consistent with Congress' intent. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 54(b)(5) advisory committee's note, citing S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 160
(1969).
87. See. eag., United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, reh'g denied, 615 F.2d 383 (5th Cir, 1980)
(district court has discretion relating to collateral measures to preserve property rather than to for-
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dural guidelines raised concern that pretrial restraining orders effectively
deprived defendants and third parties of their property interests without
adequate notice or an opportunity for a hearing.88
b. Potential Harm to Third Parties
Pretrial restraints of potentially forfeitable property restrict the tradi-
tional property rights of alienability and enjoyment.89 Not only can
property restraints deprive third parties of the "continued possession and
use of" property,90 but these restraints can cause significant economic
damage to legitimate enterprises that possess an interest in the restricted
property. " A corporation, for example, whose shareholder is indicted
feiture itself), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 240 (E.D.
Cal. 1982) (RICO and Continuing Criminal Enterprise statutes provide "little guidance as to how
and under what circumstances" district court may grant restraining orders). Cf United States v.
Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981) (indictment alone not enough to allow restraining order
under Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute). But cf United States v. Beckham, 562 F. Supp. 488
(E D. Mich. 1983) (refusing to apply standard that court determine whether jury is likely to find
RICO defendants guilty beyond reasonable doubt before it may issue pretrial restraining order).
;ome courts have applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the criminal forfeiture context.
See. e.g., United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1468, reh'g denied, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1986)
(because Rule 65 applies "to the issuance of all restraining orders and injunctions by the courts of
the United States" and because statutory language does not negate the application of Rule 65, the
Rule applies to criminal forfeiture under Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act);
United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (recognizing Rule 65 requirement of
immediate hearing after ex parte restraining order under RICO). But cf Beckham, 562 F. Supp. at
489 (refusing to adopt Spilotro standard).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
[e]very order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons
for its issuance, shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by
reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is
binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and
attornevs. and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receire
actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
FtD. R. CiV. P. 65(d) (emphasis added). The language of Rule 65(d) suggests that, where a federal
court chooses to apply this rule of procedure in the context of a criminal RICO restraining order,
certain third parties would be bound not to assist defendants in dissipating property prior to convic-
tion It is unlikely, however, that the prospect of contempt sanctions alone sufficiently will deter
third parties from violating the order. See infra note 107.
88 See Reed & Gill, supra note 4, at 72-73 (no statutorily mandated procedures to protect
defendant and third-party property interests prior to trial).
89 Reed & Gill, supra note 4, at 76.
90. See id. (quoting Fuentes %. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972)) (citations omitted).
91 See id. at 72. "Partners may not welcome the United States as a new partner. secured
parties will not particularly appreciate forfeiture of their secured interests, and shareholders cannot
he said to happily suffer economic loss when a substantial part or all of their corporation is forfeited
upon a defendant/co-owner's conviction." Id.
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under RICO may incur damage such as depreciation of asset value, lost
investment opportunities, and impairment of both goodwill and credit
rating if a district court restrains property in which the corporation has
an interest.92
As originally enacted, section 1963 provided no pretrial standard for
distinguishing defendant and third-party property interests.93 This ab-
sence of pretrial procedural guidelines did not prevent district courts
from restraining third-party property,94 but it did lead to inconsistent
treatment of third-party interests.95
B. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
Section 302 of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 198496 (the
1984 Act) substantially overhauled RICO's criminal forfeiture provi-
sions.97 The 1984 Act expanded the scope of forfeitable property and
provided more detailed procedures applicable to criminal forfeiture pro-
ceedings. 98  Although section 1963 now recognizes third-party inter-
ests, 99 it does not guarantee third-party property immunity from pretrial
restraints or forfeiture. 1°°
Congress amended section 1963 because it believed that federal law
enforcement agencies were not actively pursuing criminal forfeiture
92. See id. (adding that "in a complex RICO prosecution the period between indictment and
conviction may well exceed a year; following appeal, two years"). Economic damage may be partic-
ularly extensive when RICO is used to freeze the assets of investment firms, which rely heavily on
the liquidity of their assets.
93. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1980). In L'Hoste, the Fifth
Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that criminal RICO forfeiture was a discretionary
sanction. The Fifth Circuit upheld the forfeiture of defendant's interest in stock despite the fact that
his wife had a community property interest in the stock. The court concluded that Congress' provi-
sion of postconviction relief "plainly addressed the possible hardship that forfeiture could cause to
innocent parties . I..." d. at 812. See also Comment, supra note 11, at 356 (suggesting holding in
L'Hoste constitutional because in personam forfeiture no greater deprivation of innocent spouse's
community property interests than any other criminal penalty against guilty spouse).
95. Compare L'Hoste, 609 F.2d at 796 with United States v. Ambrosio, 575 F. Supp. 546, 552
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (distinguishing L'Hoste and holding that innocence of third party in an in per-
sonam forfeiture proceeding is valid defense).
96. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, tit. III, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 302, 98 Stat.
2040 (1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989)) (Title III also known
as the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984).
97. See generally B. GEORGE, supra note 70, at 585; Reed, supra note 31, at 748.
98. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 193.
99. See infra notes 111-12, 134-45 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 112-13, 131, 138-39 and accompanying text.
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under the RICO statute0 1 and that courts were unduly restricting the
scope and effectiveness of the forfeiture sanction. 102 In Congress' view,
the government's failure to realize forfeiture's full potential as an eco-
nomic weapon against racketeering" resulted from numerous statutory
limitations and ambiguities."° The new law thus relaxed the limits on
potentially forfeitable property and provided more extensive procedural
guidance for pretrial restraints and postconviction forfeiture.' 0 5
One of the most significant impediments to the effectiveness of crimi-
nal forfeiture was section 1963's failure adequately to prevent a defend-
ant from escaping forfeiture by transferring or otherwise concealing
forfeitable assets prior to conviction. 116 In amending section 1963, Con-
gress intended to make it more difficult for a defendant to escape the
economic impact of forfeiture.' 07 The 1984 Act amendments and legisla-
tive history, however, strongly suggest that Congress did not intend to
make criminal forfeiture more effective wholly at the expense of innocent
third-party interests.'10
1. Relation Back Doctrine
The 1984 Act broadened the scope of property subject to forfeiture by
extending the relation back doctrine0 9 to criminal forfeiture. 110 Section
101. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20. at 191-92, 194. See Reed, supra note 31, at 761.
102, S, REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 194-97 & nn.18, 20, 21 (citations omitted).
103. Title III of the 1984 Act also amended the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute, 21
U.S C § 848 (1982), because of similar concerns with drug trafficking. 21 U.S.C.S. § 853 (Law. Co-
op, Supp. 1989) provides for criminal forfeiture of property of a defendant who violates § 848.
104. S, REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 191-92.
105 d. at 192. See Reed, supra note 31, at 760-61.
10i S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 195. Congress recognized that, unlike civil forfeiture in
which the government immediately seizes the asset, in criminal forfeiture the defendant retains the
potentially forfeitable property until convicted of the substantive offense. A defendant who antici-
pates RICO charges, therefore, has ample opportunity to conceal assets and thereby escape forfei-
ture See id. at 197; B. GEORGE, supra note 70, at 593.
107 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 195. Congress found that postindictment, pretrial
restraining orders and contempt sanctions were insufficient mechanisms with which to preserve the
economic impact of forfeiture.
108 See id. at 201 & n.29, 206 n.42.
109 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. Congress referred to the relation back doc-
trine a'. the "taint" theory. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 200.
110 See Reed, supra note 31, at 756-59. Section 1963(c) provides that:
All right, title, and interest in property described in [section 1963(a)] vests in the United
States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section. Any such
property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may be the
subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the
United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to [section 1963(1)]
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1963(c) provides that title to forfeitable property vests in the United
States when the defendant commits the acts that constitute the RICO
offense."1 I The government, however, cannot void a subsequent transfer
if the transferee establishes at a postconviction hearing' 12 that she is a
"bona fide purchaser for value.., who at the time of purchase was rea-
sonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfei-
"1113ture ....
Until the 1984 Act, the relation back doctrine had been confined to
civil forfeitures. 114 Although Congress admitted its uncertainty as to
whether this concept applied to criminal forfeiture," 5 it incorporated the
relation back doctrine into RICO criminal forfeiture as a means to pre-
vent a defendant from avoiding forfeiture altogether. 1 6 Under the cur-
rent version of section 1963, title to forfeitable property vests with the
United States upon the commission of the underlying racketeering of-
fense.' ' By adding the relation back doctrine to section 1963, Congress
has further blurred the distinction between in rem and in personam
forfeitures." 8
Nevertheless, section 1963 preserves the important distinction that
criminal forfeiture depends upon the guilt of the defendant. Because
property is not forfeited unless the defendant is convicted,' 19 the govern-
ment cannot divest a truly innocent transferee 2 ° of her interest in prop-
that he is a bona fide pruchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this
section.
18 U.S.C.S § 1963(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). See also 21 U.S.C.S. § 853(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1989) (criminal forfeiture under Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute); supra note 37 and accom-
panying text.
111. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). See United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F,2d
798 (7th Cir. 1985) (government interest vests at time of violation and government can recover illicit
proceeds despite subsequent transfer).
112. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (describing the judicial proceeding).
113. Id. § 1963(c).
114. See Reed, supra hote'31, at 756.
115. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 196. Congress did recognize certain conceptual differ-
ences between civil and criminal forfeitures and presumably intended to preserve the distinction
when it explicitly reaffirmed RICO criminal forfeiture as an in personam proceeding. Id. at 193.
116. Id. at 200-01. Congress thus expected to close a "potential loophole" by preventing a de-
fendant from avoiding forfeiture through a transfer that was not an arm's length transaction, Id.
117. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying
text.
118. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
119. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(e) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (district court judgment of forfeiture
"[u]pon conviction").
120. A truly innocent transferee under section 1963(c) is "a bona fide purchaser for value ..
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erty that the defendant transferred to her prior to conviction.' 2 '
Consequently, the relation back doctrine under section 1963 broadens
the scope of forfeitable property only to the extent that a third person
knowingly, or in bad faith, assists a defendant in attempting to escape
forfeiture. 1
22
2. Pretrial Procedural Guidelines
In the 1984 Act amendments, Congress replaced an ambiguous and
general pretrial restraining order provision123 with a more detailed set of
procedures designed both to preserve the availability of forfeitable prop-
erty and to provide some constitutional safeguards against the erroneous
deprivation of property.1 24 Section 1963(d) now provides that a district
court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution
of a bond, or take other action to prevent the dissipation of assets prior to
who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to
forfeiture .... " Id. § 1963(c).
121 In contrast to criminal forfeiture, the bona fide nature of a subsequent transaction in the
civil forfeiture context is both (a) not dispositive, because the property owner's innocence does not
preclude forfeiture, and (b) less likely, because the government can seize property immediately. See
5upra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
122 In 1986 Congress further broadened the scope of forfeitable property when it gave district
courts the authority to order the forfeiture of a defendant's otherwise nonforfeitable assets whenever
the defendant has made forfeitable assets unavailable. Section 1963(m) authorizes the forfeiture of
substitute assets equivalent in value to a forfeitable asset that:
(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;
(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty.
18 U.S CS. § 1963(m) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). Congress originally included
this amendment in the 1984 Act as i new section 1963(d) but withheld it from the final bill. See S.
REP. No. 225. supra note 20, at 201
Congress intended that district courts exercise this authority as a counterpart to the relation back
doctrine under section 1963(c). When the government, under the relation back doctrine, cannot
recover assets that the defendant has transferred to a bona fide third party, district courts must order
the forfeiture of substitute assets See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(m) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); S. REP. No.
225. %upra note 20, at 201 n.30. Likewise, the district court can order the forfeiture of substitute
assets in order to avoid the difficulty of dividing commingled property. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(m)(5)
(Law Co-op. Supp. 1989). District courts may find this alternative particularly attractive when a
defendant's proprietary interest in a corporation, partnership or other legitimate enterprise is subject
to forfeiture and other unindicted third parties own similar proprietary interests.
123. See \upra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
124, S'e S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 203 ("sole purpose" of restraining order provision
"to preserve the status quo"); Reed, supra note 31, at 762-69.
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conviction. 125 A district court can take such action upon or prior to the
filing of an indictment or information, 126 but only after notice to "per-
sons appearing to have an interest in the property" and opportunity for a
hearing. 12
7
Congress clarified that a district court's authority to enter a postindict-
ment restraining order under section 1963(d)(1)(A) rests solely on the
indictment or information, 128 and not on any additional evidentiary pre-
requisite. 129 Section 1963(d)(1)(A) does not require notice or opportu-
nity for a hearing before the court can issue a restraining order.
13
Indeed, Congress prohibited any party who claims an interest in poten-
tially forfeitable property from intervening in the criminal trial or appeal
or initiating any postindictment action until after conviction. '' The leg-
islative history of the 1984 Act, however, indicates that Congress did not
intend to preclude a third party from contesting the propriety of a re-
straining order at a postorder hearing.'3 2
125. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(d)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
126. Section 1963(d)(1)(A) provides that the district court may take such action "upon the filing
of an indictment or information charging a violation of section 1962... and alleging that the prop-
erty with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture
under this section." Id. § 1963(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
127. Section 1963(d)(1)(B) requires that, before issuing a preindietment order, the court deter-
mine that:
(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will prevail on the issue of
forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will result in the property being destroyed,
removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture;
and
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through the entry of the re-
quested order outweighs the hardship on any party against whon the order is to be entered
Id. § 1963(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
Section 1963(d)(2) authorizes a temporary restraining order prior to indictment without notice or
opportunity for a hearing. See id. § 1963(d)(2). The analysis of this Note and the concerns that it
raises presumably apply equally to pretrial restraining orders issued under § 1963(d)( .). While
§ 1963(d)(2) may pose problems independent of § 1963(d)(1), this Note does not purport to resolve
them.
128. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
129. Congress emphasized that the indictment or information alone provided a sufficient basis
for issuance of a pretrial restraining order. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 202. Congress was
concerned with preventing the court from looking behind the indictment or requiring the govern-
ment to present evidence prematurely regarding the merits of the criminal case. Id.
130. Congress concluded that the indictment itself provides notice of the government's intent to
seek forfeiture. SEN. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 203. See Reed, supra note 31, at 763; supra
note 83.
131. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(e), (j), (1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
132. Congress clarified that the postindietment restraining order provision does not preclude any
postorder hearing at which the court may modify or vacate "an order that was clearly improper"
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/5
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Congress authorized a district court to enter a preindietment re-
straining order under section 1963(d)(1)(B) because it recognized that a
defendant might anticipate criminal RICO charges and dissipate her as-
sets before the return of an indictment.1 33 Congress, however, provided
defendants and other "persons" 3 g some due process safeguards.1 35 Un-
like postindictment restraints, section 1963(d)(1)(B) requires notice and
opportunity for a hearing before the court may enter a preindictment
permanent restraining order.'36 Congress thus balanced the need to pre-
vent a defendant's preindictment dissipation of forfeitable assets with
minimum standards of fairness toward the defendant and interested third
parties. 37
The language of section 1963(d)(1)(B) suggests Congress contemplated
that a district court might enter a preindictment restraining order against
an unindicted third party. Specifically, subsection 1963(d)(1)(B)(i) re-
quires notice to interested third parties.' Subsection (d)(l)(B)(ii) also
requires that the court find the need to preserve the property under the
restraining order outweighs "the hardship on any party against whom the
order is to be entered . . . ." " While this language clearly implicates
third-party property interests during the preindictment phase of a RICO
criminal forfeiture case, it provides no special procedures for handling
defendant and third-party property claims differently.' 4 °
By contrast, the 1984 Act did establish procedures for a district court
(e g., when information presented at the hearing shows that the property restrained was not among
the property named in the indictment). S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 203. See also id. at 206
n 42 (third party, with interest in potentially forfeitable property can participate in hearing regarding
restraining order). Even if the indictment accurately named property subject to forfeiture, a third
party may argue that hardship on the third party outweighs the government's need to preserve the
a ailability of the property. See supra note 127. It is unclear, however, exactly what type of harm to
turd-party interests the court would consider a "hardship" outweighing the government's interest.
133 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 202.
134. See vupra note 127 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 42-57.
136 18 U.SC.S. § 1963(d)(l)(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). For temporary restraining orders
prior to indictment, § 1963 requires only a subsequent hearing. See id. § 1963(d)(2); supra note 127.
137 Sc,, S. RiP. No. 225, supra note 20. at 203-04 (extending the rationale of Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text, to post-
poiment of notice and hearing in context of criminal forfeiture). Congress, however, stopped short
of directing district courts whether and how to modify restraining orders that impose undue hard-
ships on third-party property owners- Sec upra note 132 and accompanying text.
13X 11 U.S.C.S. § 1963(d)(l)(B) See supra note 127.
130 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(d)(l)(B)(n) (emphasis added). See supra note 127: Reed, supra note 31.
at 767,
140 Sce Reed. Nupra note 31, at 767 (third-party interests in limbo until after forfeiture).
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to handle third-party property claims during the postconviction phase. 141
The 1984 Act granted third parties the right to judicial review of their
property claims in the event the court enters a forfeiture judgment. 42 A
district court will grant relief to a third party who has established at a
post-trial hearing either that she is a bona fide purchaser 43 or that she
has a legal property interest that vested in her or was superior to the
defendant's interest "at the time of the commission of the acts which
gave rise to the forfeiture . ". .. "4 The postconviction provisions of
section 1963 thus reflect Congress' intent to preserve criminal forfeiture
as an in personam proceeding; forfeiture of third-party property can oc-
cur only when the third party holds property subject to the government's
interest under section 1963's limited relation back doctrine.' 45
III. UNITED STATES V. REGAN: THE SECOND CIRCUIT WIELDS
QUESTIONABLE POWER OVER UNINDICTED THIRD PARTIES
A. Analysis
In United States v. Regan,14 6 the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit held that section 1963 authorizes the pretrial restraint of potentially
forfeitable property in the possession of an unindicted third party. The
court upheld a pretrial restraining order against a consortium of
unindicted investment partnerships, prohibiting transfers of any of the
partnerships' assets, other than in the ordinary course of business, with-
out prior government approval. 147 The court, however, required the re-
moval of restraints on the partnerships if restraints on individual assets of
the RICO defendants could preserve sufficiently the full value of poten-
tially forfeitable property.' 48
141. See Reed, supra note 31, at 770-71. Section 1963 also authorizes the Attorney General to
protect the rights of innocent persons upon seizure and disposition of the forfeited property or upon
a third party's petition for mitigation or remission of forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(e), (f), (g),
(h) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
142. See id. § 1963(1); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 207 (no need to exhaust administrative
remedies first); Reed, supra note 31, at 770.
143. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963 (1)(6)(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20,
at 209 & n.47. See also supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
144. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(l)(6)(A). See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 208 ("Criminal forfei-
ture is an in personamn proceeding. Thus, an order of forfeiture may reach only property of the
defendant, save in those instances where a transfer to a third party is voidable.") (emphasis added).
145. See supra notes 109-22.
146. 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988).
147. Id. at 121.
148. Id.
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In Regan, the government alleged that the individual defendants used
Princeton/Newport Partners, L.P. and 19 other associated business ven-
tures (collectively, the Princeton/Newport Group) 4 9 to engage in illegal
stock transactions in violation of federal tax and securities laws.150 The
RICO indictment sought forfeiture of the defendants' illicit proceeds and
their twelve percent interest in the Princeton/Newport Group. 15  In ad-
dition to a restraint on the defendants' personal assets, 152 the district
court entered an order directly against the Princeton/Newport Group, a
nondefendant. The order required government approval of dispositions
149. Five of the six defendants held various equity and managerial positions in the
Princeton/Newport Group. One was a managing general partner of Princeton/Newport Partners.
Another was a general partner responsible for managing the financial operations of the Group. A
third was a general partner who directed the Group's trading activity. Id. at 117.
150 The government alleged that the defendants used the Princeton/Newport Group (1) to
engage in sham transactions to create fictitious losses in violation of revenue laws, and (2) to "park"
stock for Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc., in violation of securities laws. Id. "Parking" involves
undisclosed arrangements to conceal the ownership of securities. Orland, supra note 14, at C3, col.
I The grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendants with
(i) conspiring to commit securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, tax fraud, and to create
and maintain false books and records in violation of the securities laws; (ii) conspiring to
conduct and participate in the affairs of a racketeering enterprise consisting of the
Princeton/Newport Group: (iii) conducting and participating in that racketeering enter-
prise; and (iv) committing mail and wire fraud.
S58 F.2d at 117. For a more detailed description of the RICO charges and the defendants' alleged
conduct, see United States v. Regan, 713 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). On July 31, 1989, a federal
jurN convicted defendants on 63 of 64 counts, including racketeering charges. See Wall St. J., Aug.
1. 1981) at A3. col. I (unreported opinion).
151. 858 F.2d at 117. As of December 9, 1988, Princeton/Newport Group had total assets
worth 1,270 million. L.A. Times, Dec. 9. 1988, § 4, at 4, col. I.
After convicting defendants, the federal jury rendered a forfeiture verdict totalling $3.8 million,
much less than the S21.7 million that the government sought. See Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1989, at B6,
col 4 (unreported opinion) One juror justified this differential by describing her belief, shared by
other jurors, that the government sought an "exorbitant" amount from the defendants. Id.
On November 6, 1989. Judge Carter declared four of the six defendants' forfeitures unconstitu-
tional under the eighth amendment. Nat'l L.J., Nov. 20, 1989, at 3, col. 2. See United States v.
Regan, No. 88 Cr. 517 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1989). Before vacating the forfeitures, Judge Carter ruled
that the jury had no power to diminish the forfeitures that the government had sought under the
statutc Nat'l L.J., Nov. 6. 1989, at 30. col. 1. The judge earlier had indicated that he might
overrule the forfeiture verdict and order the forfeiture of the full amount on the basis that the de-
fendants, interests ii the enterprise are entirely forfeitable. Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1989, at B6, col. 4.
While this latest ruling applies to RICO defendants' postconviction forfeiture, it might also cast
further doubt on the appropriate scope of pretrial restraints. In calculating the forfeitable amount of
a,%,ets to specify in the RICO indictment, prosecutors may have to reduce the figure to meet eighth
amendment requirements, thereby reducing the amount that a district court might restrain prior to
trial. Se wupra notes 83. 126 and accompanying text. infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
152 The district court froze the defendants' personal accounts and restrained them from with-
drasing their partnership interests Id at 117-18.
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not in the ordinary course of business. t53 The court also appointed a
government monitor to review the Princeton/Newport Group's financial
records.' 54 The Princeton/Newport Group appealed on the ground that
the district court had no authority under section 1963(d)(1)(A) to re-
strain the assets of unindicted third parties or affect the use of nonforfeit-
able assets. 155
The Second Circuit in Regan held that section 1963(d)(1)(A) autho-
rizes restraints on unindicted third parties where restraints on the de-
fendant would not 'preserve sufficiently the full value of potentially
forfeitable property. 156 The court reasoned that, because section 1963
focuses on forfeitable property rather than the parties, the district court
has broad power to preserve the availability of such property."5 7 The
court stated that a "wholesale bar" to restraints on third parties would
defeat the purpose of section 1963, particularly when the defendants oc-
cupy "crucial managerial positions" within an enterprise that has power
over potentially forfeitable property.' 5
8
The Second Circuit also rejected the Princeton/Newport Group's ar-
gument that common-law principles preclude courts from restraining
property of third parties who are not before the court.'5 9 According to
153. Id. The district court thus effectively froze $270 million in defendant and third-party as-
sets. See supra note 151.
154. The order guaranteed that
[e]ntities doing business with [Princeton/Newport Group] or defendants will not be
deemed in violation of [the] Order for any transactions undertaken with the
[Princeton/Newport Group] or defendants, and shall be fully protected in connection with
any transactions with the [Princeton/Newport Group], if they receive an oral representa-
tion to them by an employee of the entities, other than the defendants, that the transaction
is allowed by this Order.
The order also provided that "e]ntities doing business with the [Princeton/Newport Group] shall be
entitled to presume the authenticity of representations and instructions from any person who is
identified as an employee of the [Princeton/Newport Group]." Id. at 118. While the court did not
discuss the rationale for this guarantee, it presumably recognized that without such qualifying lan-
guage, the order would have a more severe effect on the partnerships' ability to carry on their
business.
155. Id. at 117.
156. Id. at 119. The potentially forfeitable property included illegal proceeds and the value of
the partnership interests of the individual defendants.
157. Id. The court construed § 1963(d)'s "take any other action" clause as an unambiguous
reflection of Congress' concern with preserving the status quo. See supra note 124.
158. 858 F.2d at 119-20.
159. The Princeton/Newport Group relied on FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d), Alemite Mfg. Corp. v.
Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) ("no court can make a decree which will bind any one
but a party") and Heyman v. Kline, 444 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971) (wife, who was not party to action
against husband, was not served with process, and did not appear, is subject to courts jurisdiction)
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the court, a section 1963(d)(1)(A) restraining order resembles garnish-
ment or attachment, remedies that courts routinely direct at third par-
ties.'"' The court also relied on a Third Circuit decision upholding a
restraining order under an analogous criminal forfeiture statute1 61
against a third party to whom the defendant had transferred an asset the
third party knew was forfeitable. 16
2
The Second Circuit in Regan suggested that an order restraining all of
a third party's assets, only some of which are forfeitable, is not necessar-
ily inappropriate. 63  The court ruled that a restraint of all of
Princeton/Newport Group's assets would be inappropriate unless re-
straints on the individual defendants' other assets did not sufficiently pre-
serve the full value of forfeitable property. 164 Because the defendants
held managerial positions in the enterprise, the court found that the re-
straining order against the Princeton/Newport Group was not necessar-
ily unreasonable to prevent the dissipation of the enterprise's assets. 65
The court, however, was unable to measure the value of the defendants'
forfeitable property and remanded to the district court for a determina-
tion of whether the restraint of Princeton/Newport Group's assets was
necessary.' 66
to argue that common-law principles precluded the district court from subjecting it to the restraining
order because it was not a party before the court. 858 F.2d at 120.
160 Id. See supra note 50.
161. 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (Supp. IV 1986) (the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute).
162, 858 F.2d at 120 (relying on United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981)). The Third
Circuit in Long recognized that the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute provided for in per-
sonam criminal forfeiture, but it upheld a restraining order against a third party to whom the de-
fendant had transferred an allegedly forfeitable airplane. The Long court, however, did recognize
that the defendant had transferred illegal proceeds (the airplane) to a "knowing" third party. Long,
654 F 2d at 916. Regarding the significance of such a third party's "knowledge," see supra notes
112-13 and accompanying text.
The Second Circuit in Regan declined to follow United States v. Ambrosio, 575 F. Supp. 546, 552
(E.D.N.Y 1983), which held that the innocence of a third party in an in personam forfeiture pro-
ceeding is a valid defense to a restraining order. The Second Circuit vaguely referred to the absence
of the language "'or take any other action" in § 1963(d)(1)(A) at the time of the Ambrosio decision.
858 F 2d at 120 n.5. The difference in the restraining order provisions to which the Second Circuit
referred seems tnvial at best. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
163. 858 F.2d at 120.
164 Id. at 121. The court relied on the postconviction provision that authorizes the forfeiture of
substitute assets. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(m)(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); supra note 122.
165 858 F.2d at 121. See also id. at 120 (nature of business and opportunity). The court might
have concluded otherwise had it known that just several months after its decision to uphold the
restraining order, Princeton/Newport Partners, L.P. would be liquidated. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 16,
1989, at DI, col. 3.
166 858 F.2d at 121. The court stated that Princeton/Newport should have the opportunity to
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B. Critique
In United States v. Regan, the Second Circuit failed to assess com-
pletely the scope of a district court's authority over third-party property
interests under section 1963(d). While it is clear that the primary pur-
pose of the pretrial restraining order is to preserve the availability offor-
feitable property,167 it is unclear whether the language of section 1963(d)
authorizes a district court to accomplish this goal by restraining more
than what is ultimately forfeitable.168 The legislative history of the 1984
Act suggests that Congress did not intend to reach nonforfeitable prop-
erty to preserve potentially forfeitable property prior to conviction. 169
The Second Circuit also failed to acknowledge the legal differences be-
tween in personam and in rem forfeitures.170  In reasoning that section
1963(d)(1)(A) focuses on forfeitable property and not on the parties to
the proceeding,17 1 the court implicitly ignored Congress' characteriza-
post a bond "to the extent that the value of a defendant's restrained nonpartnership properties ex-
ceeds that of the proceeds he receives, but not that of all his potentially forfeitable property..." Id.
The court considered the posting of a bond less burdensome on third parties than a restraining order.
Id. The court, however, did not discuss the potential financial burden that the posting of a bond
might impose on firms that rely heavily on capital liquidity, such as the firms that comprised the
Princeton/Newport Group. See supra note 92.
167. See supra notes 107, 124-26 and accompanying text.
168. The Second Circuit interpreted the language "take any other action" broadly to restrain
unindicted third parties under § 1963(d)(1)(A). This may be consistent with the Supreme Court's
sanction in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) and its broad reading of the statute in light
of what Congress intended to achieve. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. Conversely,
the court might not justifiably have given § 1963(d) such a broad scope had it also interpreted the
language that dealt with the property that the indictment alleged to be forfeitable: ".. . the property
with respect to which the order is sought .... " See supra note 126. Instead, the Second Circuit
conclusively stated that the statute was unambiguous. 858 F.2d at 118-19. The court, however, also
stated that "[u]nder the terms of [s]ection 1963(d)(1)(A), therefore, the property sought to be re-
strained by a restraining order must be potentially forfeitable." Id. at 118 (emphasis added). This
suggests that § 1963(d) does not authorize a court to restrain more than what is ultimatley
forfeitable.
169. For limits on the relation back doctrine, see supra notes 112-13, 119-22 and accompanying
text. By failing to recognize the ambiguity of§ 1963(d) with respect to the restrainability of nonfor.
feitable assets, the Second Circuit overlooked "a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary."
See Russello, 464 U.S. at 20 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)). While
Congress acknowledged that the purpose of the restraining order provisions was to preserve the
status quo, see supra note 124, it also expected that a district court might have to modify or vacate an
overly broad order. See S. RFP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 203 (indicating that a "clearly improper"
order includes one in which "property restrained was not among the property named in the
indictment").
170. See supra notes 29-32, 35-41 and accompanying text.
171. See 858 F.2d at 119.
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tion of RICO criminal forfeiture as an in personam proceeding. 172 In
addition, the Regan court cursorily analogized section 1963 restraining
orders to the civil remedies of garnishment and attachment. 7 3 Although
the court ultimately required the use of less burdensome restraints on
third parties whenever available,' 74 the court's superficial construction of
section 1963(d) moves RICO criminal forfeiture closer to Calero-Toledo
and other civil forfeiture cases, where the innocence of a property owner
is virtually irrelevant. 7 5
The Second Circuit's conclusion in Regan that a district court may
restrain nonforfeitable assets of third parties is inconsistent with Con-
gress' limited use of the relation back doctrine in section 1963(c).' 76 The
extension of section 1963(c) to preindictment or postindictment re-
straining orders implies that judicial authority over third-party property
is limited to property of a non-bona fide transferee who had reason to
believe that the property was forfeitable.'77 Such a limit, however, does
not address third parties who merely hold proprietary interests in the
same enterprise in which a RICO defendant owns an interest. While
section 1963(c)'s relation back doctrine may preserve identifiable physi-
cal assets and proceeds to the extent of forfeitability, it is unclear whether
this doctrine applies equally to prevent third parties from dissipating or
devaluing proprietary interests in the enterprise as a whole.
C. Effect of Second Circuit's Decision
The Second Circuit in Regan significantly enhanced the effectiveness of
RICO criminal forfeiture. Federal prosecutors may now seek the re-
straint of nonforfeitable, third-party assets whenever a defendant's per-
sonal assets insufficiently preserve the total value of forfeitable
property. 7 ' A third party's innocence remains important, but only in
giving a court the option of entering a less burdensome restraint without
172 Se ' \upra note 59.
173. Se 858 F.2d at 120; supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
174 858 F.2d at 121; supra note 166.
175. See 5upra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit failed to distinguish
United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir, 1981) on the basis that the third-party transferee in
Long had knowledge of the indictment and potential forfeiture. See supra note 162.
177. Sec supra note 113 and accompanying text. Such an extension of § 1963(c), however, fails
to re',olve the dilemma, which the Second Circuit ultimately recognized, that a third party may have
the opportunity to dissipate the defendant's assets prior to trial. See Regan, 858 F.2d at 120-21
(defendants occupied "crucial managerial positions").
178. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text. The Justice Department's recent amend-
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jeopardizing the availability of forfeitable property. 179
The Second Circuit's decision, however, tips the scale too heavily
against innocent third parties. After Regan, innocent third parties are
not only responsible for preserving the value of a defendant's proprietary
interest in the enterprise, but they also must virtually guarantee the avail-
ability of the defendant's illicit proceeds, even if the defendant has not
invested them in the enterprise. 180  Otherwise, third parties will face
either posting a bond 1 ' or suffering the negative effects of an asset
freeze.' 8 2 The Second Circuit thus effectively disregarded Congress' in-
tent to preserve the in personam nature of section 1963 while amending
the criminal forfeiture provision.'
8 3
IV. PROPOSAL
This Note proposes that Congress revise section 1963 of the RICO
statute to clarify that it did not intend the effect of the Second Circuit
decision in Regan.'84 Although Congress created an expansive weapon
ment of RICO prosecutorial guidelines, however, might temper such an aggressive pursuit of pretrial
restraints. See supra note 14.
179. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text. Assume the defendant has a 10% share in
the enterprise worth $1 million at the time of her criminal act and that unindicted third parties own
the rest (90%) of the enterprise. Assume also that the defendant personally has gained proceeds of
$500,000 through her racketeering activity and that she has shielded her proceeds from forfeiture
(e.g., by placing them in a Swiss bank account). See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 201 & n1.31.
Because the defendant's and the third parties' assets are normally commingled in a legitimate enter-
prise, third parties in this scenario presumably have the opportunity to dissipate the defendant's
10% share of those assets and thus prevent forfeiture. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
(This, of course, assumes that the defendant induced the third parties to do so or that they would
otherwise benefit by doing so.)
Following the Second Circuit's criteria in Regan, the district court would order a restraint on all
of the third parties' assets, that is, it would freeze $10 million of defendant's and third parties' assets
to ensure the availability of $1.5 million. While the unindicted third parties may exert some control
over the defendant's 10% interest in the enterprise by virtue of the commingling of enterprise assets,
these third parties have no control over the defendant's use of the $500,000 in proceeds. Further-
more, the third parties would not forfeit the $500,000 under § 1963's postconviction provisions be-
cause the defendant's interest in the enterprise is worth only $1 million. See supra notes 141-44 and
accompanying text. The restraint, therefore, has no effect on the third parties' abilit. to preserve the
availability of the proceeds and, thus, unfairly burdens innocent third parties without serving Con-
gress' purpose of preserving forfeitable property.
181. See supra note 166.
182. See supra note 89-92 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
184. 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988). See supra notes 146-83 and accompanying text.
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against racketeering in enacting RICO's criminal forfeiture provisions, 18 5
it established and preserved section 1963 as an in personam proceed-
ing.t"' Because a third party's "innocence"'' 87 constitutes a sufficient ba-
sis for postconviction relief under section 1963,88 it should also prevent
a district court from restraining an innocent third party's nonforfeitable
assets prior to trial.
First, Congress should explicitly limit any pretrial restraint to the ex-
tent of the property interest subject to forfeiture, as alleged in the indict-
ment.'s Such a limit would comport with Congress' presumption that
the indictment provides adequate notice of the property subject to forfei-
ture. "' Because fewer assets of the enterprise would be subject to re-
straint, this requirement also would reduce the likelihood that the
government could pressure a defendant and associated, unindicted third
parties into a premature settlement or plea bargain."'
Second, section 1963 should provide special procedural safeguards for
a third party who is not a transferee of the defendant, but who is capable
of dissipating a defendant's assets.' 92 A district court may face a "con-
trol party" when a defendant owns a proprietary interest in an enterprise
in which the defendant and unindicted third parties hold crucial manage-
rial positions.
When the government seeks to preserve potentially forfeitable prop-
185 SC supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
186 Sec supra notes 96-145 and accompanying text.
187. An innocent third party in this context is a bona fide purchaser without reasonable cause to
believe that the purchased property is subject to forfeiture, or one who owns a proprietary interest in
the defendant's enterprise, but is not indicted under RICO. See supra note 113 and accompanying
text.
188 SeeC ;upra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
189 This measure would make § 1963 pretrial restraining orders consistent with the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
190 Sec supra note 130. With such a limit, the government could not surprise third parties by
restraining assets far in excess of the amount announced in the indictment as forfeitable.
191 See generally supra notes 89-92, 178-80 and accompanying text.
192 This scenario would encompass third parties who do not meet the criteria of § 1963(c)*s
relation back doctrine. This type of third party represents a middle ground under § 1963"s existing
scheme At one end is the bona fide transferee who was reasonably without cause to believe that the
property was subject to forfeiture at the time of transfer. This third party should be able to avoid
any pretrial restraint and ultimate forfeiture order on the basis that the government cannot void the
transfer under the relation back doctrine. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. At the
other end is the third party whose property is subject to restraint and forfeiture under the relation
back doctrine because title to the property has already vested in the government, rendering the
subsequent transfer void. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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erty over which an unindicted third party has control, the district court
should:
(1) restrain defendant's individual assets to the extent their value is
sufficient to secure the total value of forfeitable property;' 93 and
(2) if defendant's assets are not sufficient to secure the total value
of forfeitable property, require an unindicted third party who exer-
cises effective control over jointly held property to post bond to the
extent of the defendant's interest in the enterprise.1 94
These procedures better protect innocent third parties and more closely
adhere to the principle that an in personam forfeiture should not deprive
an innocent third party of property interests.
Third, Congress should explicitly extend a modified version of the rela-
tion back doctrine under section 1963(c) to "control party" transfers. A
district court should have the authority to void a control party's transfer
of control of the enterprise or substantially all of the enterprise's as-
sets. 195 Such an extension would minimize further the possibility of a
third party dissipating or devaluing a defendant's proprietary interest in
the enterprise. Consequently, a district court would treat consistently
the defendant and third parties who have control over the defendant's
assets,196 while stopping short of harming third parties by restraining
their nonforfeitable property.
The proposed revisions to section 1963 are necessary to ensure that
193. This is consistent with the use of § 1963(m) in the postconviction phase of the criminal
forfeiture proceeding. See supra note 122. This is also what the Second Circuit ultimately pre-
scribed in Regan. See United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 1988), supra notes 164-66
and accompanying text.
194. The Second Circuit in Regan recognized the posting of bond as a potentially less burden-
some alternative to restraining all assets of the third-party enterprise. 858 F.2d at 121. See supra
note 166.
195. In other words, § 1963(c) should also form the basis for voiding control-party transfers.
See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text. While § 1963(c) arguably operates in such a fashion
under the existing statutory framework, an explicit reference to transfers of proprietary interests
would delimit clearly the scope of the relation back doctrine under criminal forfeiture. See supra
text following note 177.
Under such an extension of the relation back doctrine, a district court could not void an arm's
length transfer of control of the enterprise or substantially all of its assets to a bona fide purchaser.
See generally notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
196. Thus, while a defendant may not transfer her proprietary interest in the enterprise to a non-
bona fide transferee, neither may a control party effectively dissipate the same proprietary interest by
merging with, or selling substantially all of its assets to, a non-bona fide transferee. The sandtion of
contempt, consequently, would serve as a last resort wiih respect to third parties as well as defend-
ants. But cf. S. REtP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 195 (suggesting !hat contempt provisions may be
ineffective in preventing defendant from defying restraining order); supra tiote 107.
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district courts construe RICO's restraining order provision more consist-
ently with both the limited application of the relation back doctrine197
and the postconviction remedies available to third parties.' 98 These revi-
sions will maintain the careful balance Congress intended to strike be-
tween the war on racketeering and the interests of innocent third
parties.' Without more clearly defined limits on and procedures for
pretrial restraints, a section 1963 restraint may unnecessarily and un-
fairly deprive truly innocent third parties of their property interests by
providing federal prosecutors and district courts the added leverage of
nonforfeitable assets to effectuate forfeiture.
Nick H. Varsam
197. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
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